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Summary
The goal of the paper is to compare nonstandard solutions implemented by Fed-
eral Reserve System, European Central Bank and National Bank of  Poland in  re-
sponse to the outbreak of a subrime crisis in United States and to debt crisis in Eu-
ropean Union. For that purpose there is carried out a comparative, descriptive analysis 
of  institutional steps taken by the  three central banks and the  governments to pre-
serve macroeconomic stability. The  nonstandard measures allowed to avoid a  come-
back of  the  Great Depression and restored market’s confidence, unfortunately at 
the cost of decreased resilience for future possible crises along with many other me-
dium and long run unintended consequences. 
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introduction
Deflation is  perceived generally as undesirable or even dangerous phe-
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es in  particular sectors of  the  economy are quite common. They result from 
higher global or local competitiveness, changing customer preferences, posi-
tive supply shocks caused by productivity increases, new technologies or ex-
ternal factors among which could be listed lower prices of  imported produc-
tion factors. In such circumstances deflation is not particularly dangerous. On 
the contrary, mentioned causes of deflation increase output, which might off-
set negative impact of  deflation. A real danger for the  economy arises when 
deflation gets continuous and is accompanied or created by contractionary de-
mand shock. Negative impact of  deflation on  a weakened economy can lead 
to downward spiral of prices, that may lead to a persistent deflation self-rein-
forcing by anchored deflationary expectations. 
Contractionary deflation might harm economic activity. When economy 
is  subjected to nominal wage rigidities it  increases unemployment, deflation 
dampens credit activity as real interest rates rise, it increases the real debt bur-
den of  debt holders (so called: debt deflation1) — which might further lead 
to deterioration of their balance sheets resulting consecutively in moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems, economic agents are discouraged from invest-
ing as real value of money rises, the alternative cost of  investments increases, 
deflation arbitrary redistributes the wealth from borrowers to lenders, decreas-
es government’s revenues, creates menu costs and might be malign for mon-
etary policy. The experience of persistent deflation is scarce making it difficult 
to estimate real costs of continuous deflation. Nevertheless, existing experienc-
es confirm that contractious, persistent deflation is  damaging for the  econo-
my and that it  is not easy to cure. The case study of  Japan is  a warning that 
getting the economy out of  the deflation trap might be a difficult challenge2. 
Unfavorable Japanese experiences and recognized channels of destructive de-
flation’s impact contributed to formulating the  dominant point of  view, that 
deflation is harmful for the economy. Persistent deflation seems to be not on-
ly harmful but its probability of occurrence was till recently highly underesti-
mated. After the 2007–2009 crisis, many monetary authorities recognized that 
the  risk of  falling into deflation is  considerably greater than it was believed3. 
Therefore, it  seems reasonable to treat the  inflation target symmetrically. 
 1 I. Fisher, The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions, „Econometrica”, Vol. 1, No. 4/1933, 
pp. 337–357.
 2 H. Kuroda, Overcoming Deflation: The  Bank of  Japan’s Challenge, Speech at the  Council 
on Foreign Relations in New York, 2013.
 3 M. Kumar, T. Baig, J. Decressin, C. Faulkner-MacDonagh, T. Feyzioglu, Deflation: 
Determinants, Risks, and Policy Options, IMF Occasional Paper, No.  221/2003; J.H.E. 
Christensen, J.A. Lopez, G.D. Rudebusch, Extracting Deflation Probability Forecasts from 
Treasury Yields, „International Journal of Central Banking”, Vol. 8 No. 4/2012, pp. 21–60.
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1. the current State of knoWledge
The institutional monetary policy frameworks, that turned out to be effec-
tive at both disinflation and maintaining low inflation environment with low 
variance of  inflation are the  implicite or explicite inflation targeting versions, 
introduced first by New Zealand (explicite one) in  the year 1990. Poland im-
plemented explicite version eight years later too. Since the beginning of 2004, 
the  continuous inflation target was set at 2.5% with a  permissible fluctua-
tion band of  +/- 1 p.p. European Central Bank selected the  inflation target 
in a more blurry way stating that it aims at inflation rates of below, but close 
to, 2.0% over the  medium term. Federal Reserve System exercises the  im-
plicite kind of  this framework with no officially appointed inflation target. 
Implicite or explicite inflation targeting is an embodiment of Rogoff ’s propos-
al of a conservative central banker, that assigns to combating inflation high but 
limited weight4. Inflation targeting framework is  a solution to time-inconsis-
tency trap, because it puts on monetary authorities certain cost when inflation 
exceeds target ranges5. Aoki presents modifications of basic inflation targeting 
framework to make it more prone to deflation6. However, the framework itself 
(with its standard instruments: interest rates, standard open market operations, 
reserve requirements) might be not enough to anchor higher inflation expecta-
tions when sufficiently severe contractionary demand shock appears. 
Therefore, Summers (1991) warned that deflation might be especially 
troublesome for monetary authorities as the  usage of  nominal interest rates 
is  limited by zero lower bound (ZLB), which might cause monetary poli-
cy incapable to effectively influence prices. It means a  danger of  falling in-
to the liquidity trap as it happened in the Japanese case. Undoubtedly, nomi-
nal interest rates are important and basic instrument of monetary authorities. 
National Bank of Poland openly underlines that they are the main instrument 
of achieving the desired inflation:“National Bank of Poland influences the lev-
el of  inflation mainly by determining the  official interest rates, which define 
yields on monetary policy instruments” — as it  is stated at NBP’s web page. 
While this statement seems appropriate for inflation periods, it is less correct 
when deflation forces monetary authorities to lower official interests rates to 
 4 K. Rogoff, The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target, „Quarterly 
Journal of Economics”, Vol. 100, No. 4/1985.
 5 F.S. Mishkin, N.J. Westelius, Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts, 
„Journal of Money, Credit and Banking”, Vol. 40, No. 4/2008.
 6 M. Aoki, A Desirable Inflation Targeting Policy in a Deflationary Economy: The Case of Japan, 




miniscule levels. European Central Bank, operating in an environment where 
the crisis was more severe and thus deflation risk was higher, is more cautious 
with determining the  relative importance of  each instruments and only gen-
erally states that:“to achieve its primary objective, the  Eurosystem uses a  set 
of monetary policy instruments and procedures.” Despite the fact, that interest 
rates are important instrument, literature and recent monetary policy respons-
es to the contractionary shock after the year 2007 indicate that monetary au-
thorities while in  ZLB still can take steps and means to try to escape from 
the liquidity and deflation trap7. Nonstandard measures, that are suggested to 
overcome the  deflation include: forward guidance, qualitative easing, quanti-
tative easing, transfers of money to the public sector, money printing, nomi-
nal GDP targeting, price level targeting, setting higher inflation target for an 
extended time period, depreciation of  the  exchange rate, cash taxation, carry 
tax, negative interest rates on  bank reserves and some degree of  cooperation 
between monetary and fiscal policies.
Nevertheless, implementing most of  the  mentioned above solutions re-
quires institutional changes in  fully-fledged inflation targeting countries, like 
Poland. Undoubtedly, boosting the  economy by purchasing government se-
curities or private junk bonds, printing money and depreciating the  ex-
change rate, or changing the  targeting scheme to price level targeting would 
be a  considerable institutional change. In Poland it would be even necessary 
to change a  constitution to allow the  central bank to purchase government 
bonds. Currently paragraph 220 of Polish constitution states that Budget Act 
cannot assume that the  budget deficit will be financed by the  central bank 
(Para. 220, Chapter X)8. Purchasing junk bonds or depreciation of  the  ex-
change rate9 in  polish circumstances could be viewed by the  public as de-
creased will to combat inflation and could result in  lost credibility of  NBP. 
Institutional changes of that kind are already not required in FED and ECB 
as they, first of  all, do not meet the  criteria of  fully-fledged inflation target-
 7 Liquidity trap and deflation trap are not the  same, although they are interconnected to 
each other and for the purpose of  this paper they are investigated as they were the  same, be-
cause in  terms of  contractionary demand shock the  same solutions to get the  economy out 
of  the  liquidity trap can be suggested to get the economy out of  the deflation trap.
 8 Case of  Poland is  atypical. Banking sector in  Poland is  over-liquid. Bank reserves are 
so huge, that it  is the  central bank that is  forced to borrow money from commercial banks. 
It might be therefore a very deep, severe contraction that purchases of commercial banks’ bonds 
would be necessary, more possibly on  the micro-scale to perform the  lender of  the  last resort 
function to recapitalize a  given bank facing a  bankruptcy (Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. (Constitution of April 2, 1997), Dz.U., No. 78, item 483.).
 9 Not to mention worsened situation of debtors, whose debt is denominated in foreign cur-
rency.
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ing strategy (especially FED) and, besides that, they already changed their in-
stitutional approach, as both FED and ECB had the  mandate and the  will 
to broaden their standard tools, to implement non-standard solutions to de-
fend against drying off lending at the  interbank market resulting from con-
tractionary demand shock after 2007. The  greatest change of  all three cen-
tral banks happened when ECB took a decision to purchase sovereign bonds 
of  the PIIGS countries10 after the outbreak of a debt crisis in  the Euro area, 
despite protests of  some German societies and contrary to conventional tra-
dition of  the BundesBank. 
2. the methdology of reSearch
Quarterly and annual data come from Federal Reserve System, European 
Central Bank data Warehouse, National Bank of Poland, Eurostat and Central 
Statistical Office of Poland and span from the year 2006 or 2007 (depending 
on  the  particular time series) to 2014. For the  purpose of  analyzing the  li-
quidity trap problem, the paper presents the case study of three central banks 
FED, ECB and NBP. The  qualitative description of  the  monetary policy 
stance and instruments implemented by the  three central banks are support-
ed by simple quantitative analysis, namely the  economic results of  the  three 
central banks are compared with the  costs needed to achieve mentioned re-
sults. In particular, pre and post crisis economic outcomes, like CPI infla-
tion, real GDP growth and unemployment rate are compared with the  con-
sequences of the implemented measures: central banks’ total assets, public debt 
to GDP ratios and official policy rates.
3. the reSearch proceSS: fed, ecb and nbp —  
SolutionS implemented 
Zero lower bound is  not just a  theoretical possibility that accidentally 
happened to Japan. After the sub-prime crisis struck, FED immediately low-
ered its federal funds rate virtually to zero. ECB was more conservative and 
hesitated with lowering the rate of main refinancing operations till economic 
turbulences became evident in  Europe. Its approach was gradual, indicating 
underestimation of  the  crisis severity. Out of  the  three banks, only NBP has 
still two p.p. of  relative safety to ZLB at the end of 2014.












































































































Figure 1. Official policy rates of FED, ECB and NBP in period 2007–2014 (in %) Federal funds rate, main 
ECB refinancing operations rate, NBP’s reference rate
Source: Own preparation based on FED, ECB, NBP.
When nominal rates lowering was no longer a possibility to stimulate in-
flation and economy in USA and in  euro area, this standard instrument had 
to be supported by forward guidance. The  Governing Council of  ECB im-
plemented forward guidance by announcing a commitment that the key ECB 
interest rates would remain at present or lower levels for an extended period 
of  time. The term “extended period of  time” was however not specified mak-
ing the  forward guidance less reliable, which is  a serious flaw as credibility 
is crucial for effectiveness of  this tool. 
FED implemented more exact forward guidance by determining 0 to ¼ 
percent target range for the  federal funds rate following the  end of  its asset 
purchase program in  October 2014. Moreover, the  bank specified the  time 
frames by announcing that forward guidance will last if projected inflation 
continues to be below the Committee’s 2 percent long-run goal, and provid-
ed that long-term inflation expectations remain well anchored.
NBP’s forward guidance is aimed not on anchoring long-run inflation ex-
pectations, but on  shorter periods of  time. While ECB and FED used it  as 
a  tool to overcome ZLB, NBP uses it  only to anchor few months expecta-
tions at stable levels, which would certainly be not enough to inflate in  case 
of persistent deflation accompanied by ZLB. At the  conference in  July 2013 
president of  NBP announced that interest rates would probably remain un-
changed till the end of 2013. In November 2013 it was declared that interest 
rates would remain probably unchanged till the end of June 2014, but this pe-
riod was in March 2014 extended till the end of third quarter of 2014. NBP, 
similarly like ECB, does not declare conditions of  exiting forward guidance, 
which might increase uncertainty and decrease efficiency of  this tool. 
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Table 1. Nonstandard solutions implemented by ECB, FED and NBP after 2007 in  response to the crisis
instruMent ecB fed nBP
ZLB on policy rates Yes Yes No
Forward guidance (FG) Yes Yes Yes
FG near ZLB Yes Yes No
Long-run FG Yes Yes No
FG exit strategy No Yes No
Qualitative easing Yes Yes Yes
Quantitative easing Yes Yes Yes
Price level targeting No No No
Higher inflation target No No No
Exchange rate depreciation No No No
Negative interest rates Yes No No
Fiscal stimulus Yes Yes No
Source: Own preparation.
Among the  most important measures, implemented after the  outbreak 
of  the  crisis, were qualitative/quantitative easing policies. ECB support-
ed regular operations by implementation of  two liquidity-providing long-
term refinancing operations in  euro with a  three-year maturity (maturing 
on  29  January 2015 and on  26 February 2015), as well as of  US dollar. In 
June 2014, ECB announced that it  will conduct a  series of  targeted longer-
term refinancing operations (TLTROs), which goal is to improve bank lend-
ing to the  euro area non-financial private sector over a  period of  two years, 















































































































main refinancing operations rate (left scale) CPI inflation (left scale)
Figure 2. Euro Area: policy rates, inflation (in %) and restoration of market’s confidence measured by EU-
RIBOR3M-EONIA spread (in b.p.) in period 2007–2014
Source: Own preparation based on ECB and EUROSTAT.
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Moreover, earlier in  2009 and in  2011 two covered bond purchase pro-
grammes were introduced (the CBPP — ended in June 2010, CBPP2 — end-
ed in October 2012). ECB from 10th of May 2010 to February 2012 launched 
the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) in order to conduct interventions 
in  debt markets. The  programme was finally terminated in  September 2012. 
However, in August 2012 the ECB announced the unprecedented possibility 
of  conducting outright open market operations in  secondary sovereign bond 
markets. In September 2014, ECB announced two new purchase programmes: 
the ABS purchase programme (ABSPP) and the third covered bond purchase 
programme (CBPP3). The purchases are carried out both in primary and sec-
ondary markets. It seems that it may be not over of expansionary nonconven-
tional policies. The  European Central Bank’s Governing Council along with 
President Draghi expect to consider a new package of broad-based asset pur-
chases, which would include sovereign debt in 2015.
FED was extremely expansionary after the outbreak of the crisis. Federal 
Reserve made a  series of  large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs), between late 
2008 and October 2014. The  bank purchased long-term securities issued by 
the U.S. government in the private market through a competitive process and 
long-term securities issued or guaranteed by government-sponsored agencies 
such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Although Fed did not purchase gov-
ernment securities directly from the  U.S. Treasury, the  size of  the  interven-















































































































Federal funds rate (left scale) CPI inflation (left scale) TED spread (right scale)
Figure 3. United States: policy rates, inflation (in %) and restoration of market’s confidence measured by 
TED spread (in b.p.) in period 2007–2014
Source: Own preparation based on FED.
When the  space for ongoing cuts of  the  federal funds rate became lim-
ited, FED launched its first large-scale purchases dubbed quantitative eas-
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ing number 1, abbreviated as QE1. Altogether later it  turned out that QE1 
was not enough and QE2 as well as QE3 were introduced too. In November 
2008 Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) initiated first huge expan-
sionary purchases, which amounted to a  total of  600 billion USD in  agency 
mortgage-backed securities and agency debt (see Board of Governors, 2008). 
The purchase programme was considerably expanded. In March 2009 FOMC 
announced that up to 1.25 trillion USD of agency mortgage backed securities, 
up to 200 billion USD of  agency debt and up to 300 billion USD of  long-
term treasury debt will be purchased (see Board of Governors, 2009). In early 
2010 the purchases were completed finishing first period of extraordinarily ex-
pansionary policy. Second round of large scale purchases dubbed QE2 started 
in November 2010. At that time FOMC stated it would continue purchases 
of  security holdings. Over a  period ending in  mid-2011 long-term Treasury 
securities to the  amount of  additional 600 billion USD were purchased (see 
Board of Governors, 2010). Later in 2011 FOMC introduced maturity exten-
sion program (MEP), which was a variation of earlier solutions. In line with 
MEP central bank purchased 400 billion USD of  long-term Treasury secu-
rities and sold an equivalent amount of  shorter-term Treasury securities over 
the period ending in June 2012 (see Board of Governors press release (2011). 
Nevertheless, FOMC extended the program till the end of 2012. 
Finally, QE3 was launched the  same year, that is  in October 2012. 
The Committee continued purchases of mortgage-backed securities at a pace 
of  40 billion USD a  month. FOMC decided also to implement qualitative 
easing policies by extending the  average maturity of  its Treasury securities’ 
holdings. Committee decided to maintain ongoing reinvestments of  its prin-
cipal holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage backed securities again in-
to agency mortgage backed securities. These actions were believed to decrease 
long-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, improve broader finan-
cial conditions. In October 2014 Fed ended its historic bond-buying program, 
a massive effort  to stimulate the economy known as QE3. 
Situation in  Poland was strikingly different from that in  United States 
and in Euro Area. Polish banking sector since half of the 90. is characterized 
by over-liquidity. That made it  more crisis-proof and resistant to cognition 
effects. Although the  whole banking system was stable, some banks experi-
enced problems with managing their liquidity. A lack of trust, represented by 
peaking spread between POLONIA and WIBOR rates, appeared at the  in-
terbank market. NBP took successfully standard and nonstandard steps to re-















































































































NBP reference rate (left scale) CPI inflation (left scale)
Figure  4. Poland: policy rates, inflation (in %) and restoration of  market’s confidence measured by WI-
BOR3M-POLONIA spread (in b.p.) in period 2007–2014
Source: Own preparation based on NBP and GUS.
One of  the  most important actions, which was introduced to avoid 
a  credit crunch, took place on 14th of October 2008. President of NBP an-
nounced a spectrum of actions that the bank decided to carry out along with 
a  special program called The  Packet of  Trust (Pakiet Zaufania). The  bank 
launched liquidity providing operations with three month maturity, increased 
the  frequency of  open market operations, announced maintenance of  issuing 
7-day NBP Bills as a  main instrument of  liquidity sterilization, introduced 
SWAP operations, modified lombard credit arrangements: decreased haircut, 
broadened the list of collateral securities. Later, next modifications were intro-
duced, including increasing maturity of  the open market operations and fur-
ther broadening the  list of  securities accepted as collateral.
Despite convincing reasons that low interests rates might be harmful for 
the  economy11 and despite the  fact, that negative deposit rates not necessar-
ily stimulate spending12, ECB decided to lower its deposit rates below zero. 
ECB implemented negative deposit facility of  -0.1% on  11th of  June 2014 
to decrease it further to -0.2% since 10th September the same year. FED did 
not decide to exercise negative deposit rates, however its deposit rates virtu-
ally equal zero. On January 13, 2014, the Federal Reserve conducted a fixed-
rate offering of term deposits with full allotment of tenders through its Term 
 11 A. Rzońca, Kryzys Banków Centralnych — skutki stopy procentowej bliskiej zera, C.H. Beck, 
Warszawa 2014.
 12 R. Rajan, A step in the dark: unconventional monetary policy after the crisis, Andrew Crockett 
Memorial Lecture by Raghuram Rajan, 2013.
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Deposit Facility. The operation offered 28-day term deposits at an interest rate 
of 0.26 percent. In December 2014 the operation offered seven-day term de-
posits at an interest rate of 0.30 percent. NBP at the end of 2014 was still rel-
atively far from negative deposit rates. Since July 2013 the deposit rate is low 
but positive and amounts to 1.0%. 
Assessing the  impact of  monetary policy on  the  recovery and on  escap-
ing from deflation trap should not be carried out regardless of  fiscal policy. 
American Congress on 13th of February 2009 passed the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act. The  act was commonly referred to as the  “stimulus 
package”. Its volume amounted originally to 787 billion USD. However, 
in  2011 it  was increased to 840 billion USD to be in  line with the  budget 
for 2012.
At the  end of 2008, there was also announced The European Economic 
Recovery Plan. The  plan consisted of  two pillars. First pillar was to boost 
aggregated demand and to restore confidence by injection of  money in-
to the  economy. The  European Comission proposed that Member States 
and the  European Union decided to give an immediate budgetary impulse 
amounting to € 200 billion, which represented 1.5% of UE GDP. The second 
pillar outlined the need to reinforce Europe’s competitiveness in the long term 
and gave a number of proposals: creating low-carbon economy, smart invest-
ments, appropriate labor market policies, investing in  energy efficiency, clean 
technologies, infrastructure and inter-connection, opening up new finance for 
SMEs and cutting administrative burdens.
In case of  Poland, there was generally little room for fiscal stimulus. In 
2013 the debt to GDP ratio was 58.3% and budget deficit was high (-4.3%). 
Poland’s debt to GDP ratio is  very close to the  threshold set in  article 216 
of the constitution13. In line with the article, it is not allowed to lend, to give 
guarantees and sponsorships when the debt exceeds three fifths of the annual 
GDP. Nevertheless, thresholds might be arbitrary changed. In 2013 govern-
ment suspended the implications imposed by first threshold. The implications 
were to be introduced, when the  debt to GDP ratio would amount to be-
tween 50 and 55.0%. Along with them, the planned deficit for the next year 
would not be allowed to exceed the current value of a budget deficit. 
Other institutional solutions, that could help to overcome the  deflation 
trap, i.e. price level targeting, setting higher inflation target and depreciation 
of  the exchange rate were not implemented neither by ECB, FED nor NBP. 
The reason for that might be that price level targeting and a commitment to 
target higher inflation seem to have little impact on creating higher inflation 
 13 Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r..., op. cit.
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expectations when the  contractionary demand shock is  of  considerable size. 
Moreover, all three measures have serious drawbacks, possibly highly damag-
ing for the economy.
4. the reSultS of the reSearch
The goals of  nonstandard monetary policy measures implemented after 
the outbreak of  a crisis 2007–2009 were to not to allow a Great Depression 
happen ever again, to preserve macroeconomic stability, to restore market’s 
confidence and to escape from a  possibility of  falling into deflation trap. 
When the  use of  expansionary fiscal policy was limited due to big debts, 
monetary policy by ‘becoming the  only game in  town’ was made responsible 
to a  large extent for output stabilization.
The analysis of this chapter allows to compare the pre crisis and post cri-
sis variables. The pre crisis year is the year 2006. While for the post crisis year 
was selected the  year 2014, to try to catch the  longest available data to as-
sess the current impact of the measures implemented. Obviously, such a sim-
ple comparison does not take into account casuality, different initial condi-
tions of  particular central banks or external factors affecting the  outcomes. 
Therefore, it  cannot be treated as an evaluation of  the  efficiency of  the non-
standard measures implemented. The  analysis might be instead treated as an 
evaluation whether a given central bank (together with government or despite 
it) managed to obtain particular outcomes taking into account the  environ-
ment it  is operating within.
Despite the  fact, that in  existing literature one can find no agreement 
on  the  efficiency of  the  nonstandard measures, undoubtedly without those 
measures the magnitudes of the contraction would be much bigger14. The non-
standard measures allowed to avoid a comeback of the Great Depression (ta-
ble 2). 
Seven years after the  outbreak of  a crisis, the  unemployment rate dete-
riorated in  USA and in  Euro Area. Output growth deteriorated in  all three 
countries. Nevertheless, despite the  output growth is  not big in  compari-
son to pre crisis values (with USA as an exception), the  contraction did not 
cause falls noted during the  Great Depression. Similarly the  unemployment 
 14 M. Bech, L. Gambacorta, E. Kharroubi, Monetary policy in  a downturn: Are finan-
cial crises special?, BIS Working Papers, No.  388/2012; H. Chen, V. Curdia, A.  Ferrero, 
The  Macroeconomic Effects Of Large-Scale Asset Purchase Programmes, „The Economic Journal”, 
Vol. 122, No. 564/2012, pp. F289–F315.
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rates, despite higher (with an exception of Poland), are far from the situation, 
when one on four US citizens was unemployed, like in the 30s. The inflation 
is  still low, sending warning signals about potential deflation. The  nonstan-
dard measures did not manage to anchor high inflation expectations, regard-
less of  the external factors in Euro Area nor in Poland. Highly expansionary 
policies allowed however to inflate in  the United States.
Table 2. Basic pre (year 2006) and post crisis (year 2014) economic variables (in %)
sPecyfication usa euro	area PoLand
Evaluation/year 2006 2014 2006 2014 2006 2014
Unemployment rate 4.60 6.20 8.30 11.6 13.8 9.0
GDP growth rate 2.7 2.4 3.40 -0.5* 6.2 3.3
CPI inflation 3.2 1.6 2.2 0.4 1.3 0.1






















































































































Figure 5. FED and ECB’s total assets in period 2006–2015, not seasonally adjusted (in mln USD)
Source: Own preparation based on FED.
All three banks had to face a problem of rising uncertainty that appeared 
on  the  market. Figures 1, 2, 3 show that FED, ECB as well as NBP man-
aged to restore market’s confidence. The  TED, EURIBOR3M-EONIA and 
WIBOR3M-POLONIA spreads decreased to its pre crisis values. Obtained 
results are in line with other researchers’ outcomes. For example, Hancock and 
Passmore15 claim that intervention of Fed markedly improved market condi-
tions, while ECB successfully avoided consequences similar to those during 
 15 D. Hancock, W. Passmore, Did the Federal Reserve’s MBS Purchase Program Lower Mortgage 
Rates?, „Journal of Monetary Economics”, Vol. 58, No. 5/2011, pp. 498–514.
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the Great Depression of the 30s16, the bank still fails to achieve its price sta-
bility objective17.
The successes of  nonstandard measures, mentioned above: avoidance 
of  a severe depression and restoration of market confidence, were not a  ‘free 
lunch’. Most apparent costs include an increase of the relation of public debt 
to GDP and an enormous increase of  central banks’ total assets, especial-
ly in case of FED (figure 5). In Poland both, the  rise of public debt in  rela-
tion to GDP as well as a  rise of NBP’s total assets were moderate (table 3).
Table  3.  Public debt in  terms of  GDP and central bank’s total assets — comparison of  pre-crisis values 
(year 2006) and post crisis values (year 2014) for United States, Euro Area and Poland
sPecyfication usa euro	area PoLand
Costs/year 2006 2014 2006 2014 2006 2014
Public debt/GDP (in %) 63.3 101.5 66.6 92.0 47.1 58.0
Central bank’s total assets 869 988 4 497 660 1 150 030 2 150 247 155 078 321 255
Source: Own preparation based on FED, ECB, NBP, GUS, EUROSTAT.
The question about the  long or medium term implications of  such pol-
icies remains open. In literature there are recognized many possible, nega-
tive consequences of  the  implemented measures18. Regardless of  those wide 
lists of possible, severe consequences, one thing is  sure, already stretched fis-
cal debts and greatly expanded central banks’ balance sheets create an envi-
ronment extremely vulnerable to severe crisis. In case new, considerably huge 
contractionary shock hit again USA or Euro Area, then both fiscal and mon-
etary policies would not be able to remain as expansionary as they were af-
ter the  2007–2009 crisis. Moreover, improvement of  central banks’ balance 
sheets and confronting sovereign debt problems are processes, that need much 
time. As the  economy keeps on  continuing a  recovery process, a  probability 
of a new crisis would gradually increase, which altogether with the imbalances 
in fiscal and monetary policies may prepare grounds for future severe depres-
sion. To avoid it, some rules, frameworks or exit strategies from easy mone-
tary policy and from governments’ fiscal packages are necessary.
 16 D. Giannone, M. Lenza, H. Pill, L. Reichlin, Non-Standard Monetary Policy Measures and 
Monetary Developments, ECB Working Paper, No 1290/2011.
 17 Á. Ubide, Is the European Central Bank Failing Its Price Stability Mandate?, „Policy Brief ”, 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, No. PB14-5/2014.
 18 A. Rzońca, op. cit.; W.R. White, Ultra easy monetary policy and the law of unintended conse-
quences, „Real-world Economics Review”, No. 63/2013; R. Rajan, op. cit.
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concluSionS 
In response to severe contractionary shocks, FED, ECB and NBP de-
cided to implement nonstandard monetary policy measures, including for-
ward guidance, quantitative and qualitative easing. Additionally, ECB intro-
duced negative deposit rates. In Euro Area and in USA monetary policy was 
also supported by fiscal packages. All these measures are a  confirmation that 
monetary policy does not necessarily has to be doomed to a  liquidity or de-
flation traps when policy rates are bound by zero lower floor and when econ-
omy is in depression. The nonstandard measures allowed to avoid a comeback 
of  the  Great Depression and stopped escalation of  the  crisis. Central banks 
managed to restore market’s confidence and fueled liquidity into the  finan-
cial market.
The size of  the  intervention was unprecedented and the  instruments ap-
plied were nonstandard. Unfortunately, the short term successes of these mea-
sures were not ‘a free lunch’ and happened at the cost of decreased resilience 
for future possible crises. Regardless of  the wide lists of possible, severe, me-
dium and long run consequences of  these actions, one thing is  sure, already 
stretched fiscal debts and greatly expanded central banks’ balance sheets create 
an environment extremely vulnerable to severe crisis. In case new, considerably 
huge contractionary shock hit again USA or Euro Area, then both fiscal and 
monetary policies would not be able to remain as expansionary as they were 
after the  2007. Moreover, improvement of  central banks’ balance sheets and 
confronting sovereign debt problems are processes, that need much time. As 
the economies would keep on recovering, a probability of a new crisis would 
gradually increase, which altogether with the  imbalances in  fiscal and mon-
etary policies may prepare grounds for future severe depression. To avoid it, 
some rules, frameworks or exit strategies from easy monetary policy and from 
governments’ fiscal packages are necessary. 
The least resilient for the  outbreak of  a new crisis are USA and Euro 
Area. In USA public debt to GDP ratio exceeded 100 percent and the mag-
nitude of  the  FED balance sheet’s extension is  enormous (figure 5), leav-
ing little room for further possible expansionary policies. Euro Area seems 
to be more crisis-proof as the  relation of  debt to GDP and the  percent-
age rise of  ECB’s balance sheet is  considerably smaller (table 3). The  safest 
in this matter is NBP. Despite bothered by some deflation concerns, the bank 
still has room for further cuts of  policy rates, the  relation of  public debt 
to GDP, although alarming, is  still smaller than in  Euro Area and in  USA, 
and the NBP’s balance sheet percentage growth within the measured period 
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is similar to the one of ECB. Nevertheless, despite implemented measures, in-
flation rate is  still dangerously low (especially in Euro Area and in Poland). 
Concluding, monetary authorities still have instruments to act in  an ex-
pansionary way during ZLB, nevertheless, the  case of  Japan and the analysis 
presented in  this paper show that deflation is  a forceful opponent (table 2). 
Moreover, the more and the heavier ammunition the governments and mon-
etary authorities use to fight deflation, the faster the bullets end (figure 5, ta-
ble 3), which might possibly create a devastating liquidity trap in  the  future. 
bibliography
Aoki M., A Desirable Inflation Targeting Policy in  a Deflationary Economy: The  Case 
of  Japan, The  Japan Research Institute Working Paper, http://papers. ssrn.com/
sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1868633 (21.02.2015).
Bech M., Gambacorta L., Kharroubi E., Monetary policy in a downturn: Are financial 
crises special?, BIS Working Papers, No. 388/2012.
Chen H., Curdia V., Ferrero A., The Macroeconomic Effects Of Large-Scale Asset Purcha-
se Programmes, „The Economic Journal”, Vol. 122, No. 564/2012, http://dx.doi.or
g/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02549.
Christensen J.H.E., Lopez J.A., Rudebusch G.D., Extracting Deflation Probability Fo-
recasts from Treasury Yields, „International Journal of  Central Banking”, Vol.  8, 
No. 4/2012.
Fisher I., The  Debt-Deflation Theory of  Great Depressions, „Econometrica”, Vol.  1, 
No. 4/1933, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1907327.
Giannone D., Lenza M., Pill H., Reichlin L., Non-Standard Monetary Policy Measures 
and Monetary Developments, ECB Working Paper, No 1290/2011.
Hancock D., Passmore W., Did the  Federal Reserve’s MBS Purchase Program Lower 
Mortgage Rates?, „Journal of Monetary Economics”, Vol. 58, No. 5/2011, http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2011.05.002.
Kumar M., Baig T., Decressin J., Faulkner-MacDonagh C., Feyzioglu T., Deflation: 
Determinants, Risks, and Policy Options, IMF Occasional Paper, No. 221/2003.
Kuroda H., Overcoming Deflation: The Bank of Japan’s Challenge, Speech at the Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations in New York, 2013.
Mishkin F.S., Westelius N.J., Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contra-
cts, „Journal of Money, Credit and Banking”, Vol. 40, No. 4/2008, http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2008.00128.x.
Rajan R., A step in the dark: unconventional monetary policy after the crisis, Andrew Cro-
ckett Memorial Lecture by Raghuram Rajan, 2013.
Rogoff K., The  Optimal Degree of  Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Tar-
get, „Quarterly Journal of  Economics”, Vol.  100, No.  4/1985, http://dx.doi.
org/10.2307/1885679.
	 is	defLation	traP	a serious	threat?	case	study	of	fed,	ecB	and	nBP	 	 259
Rzońca A., Kryzys Banków Centralnych — skutki stopy procentowej bliskiej zera, C.H. 
Beck, Warszawa 2014. 
Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. (Constitution of  April 2, 
1997), Dz.U., No. 78, item 483.
Ubide Á., Is the  European Central Bank Failing Its Price Stability Mandate?, „Policy 
Brief ”, Peterson Institute for International Economics, No. PB14-5/2014.
White W.R., Ultra easy monetary policy and the  law of unintended consequences, „Real-
-world Economics Review”, No. 63/2013.

